

BANKING AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY

Case Study: Local Government Investment Pools

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May 2017

LGIPs


- ▶ Many states and counties in the U.S. operate a Local Government Investment Pool (LGIP)
 - ▶ participants are local governments, school districts and other public entities
- ▶ Timing of tax revenues differs from timing of expenditures
 - ▶ place their excess cash in pool, which is invested in securities
- ▶ Benefit: economies of scale
 - ▶ access to better investments, shared management costs, etc.
 - ▶ aim to earn a higher return while maintaining safety, liquidity
- ▶ Some of these pools are quite large
 - ▶ total assets of over \$250 billion in 2007

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- ▶ LGIPs operate very much like a Diamond-Dybvig bank
 - ▶ mutual arrangement among participants
 - ▶ participants buy *shares* in the fund (\sim deposit endowment)
 - ▶ price of a share is typically fixed at \$1.00 ($\sim c_1^*$)
 - ▶ can be redeemed on demand ($\sim t = 1$)
 - ▶ unredeemed shares pay dividends (or interest, $\sim c_2^*$ at $t = 2$)
 - ▶ The pool invests in a portfolio of assets
 - ▶ bank deposits, certificates of deposit, government bonds
 - ▶ commercial paper issued by banks, non-financial firms and other entities
 - ▶ some assets are more liquid than others ($\sim x$ and $1 - x$)

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- ▶ LGIPs have operated successfully for many years
 - ▶ There have been occasional problems
 - ▶ Orange County, CA filed for bankruptcy in 1994 after its LGIP suffered large losses on interest rate derivatives
 - ▶ But these events were rare
 - ▶ and had led to increased restrictions on pools' investment options
 - ▶ In 2007, the Florida LGIP was the largest in the country
 - ▶ about 1,000 participants, \$27 billion in assets
 - ▶ by some reports, it had the highest return of any public fund in the U.S.
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

Trouble in Paradise

- ▶ In November 2007, news surfaced that the Florida LGIP had invested in assets related to subprime mortgages
- ▶ Some participants began withdrawing their funds
 - ▶ quickly turned into a full-fledged bank run



>30% of pool
withdrawn on
Nov. 28-29

- ▶ The pool's potential losses were small



- ▶ One participant who withdrew commented:

“Truthfully, it was a relatively small percentage of the portfolio. But it scared a lot of people, because local governments would never invest in that.” (New York Times, Nov. 30, 2007)

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- ▶ But once the run started ...
 - ▶ pool's (large) holdings of liquid assets were quickly exhausted
 - ▶ remaining assets were (mostly) high-quality, but illiquid (i.e., costly to sell at short notice, $\sim r < 1$)
 - ▶ pool could not continue to meet withdrawal demand (\sim Assumption A1: $c_1^* > 1 - (1 - r)x^*$)
- ⇒ Participants' decision to withdraw was completely rational
- ▶ once the run began, did not matter if losses were large or small
 - ▶ strong incentive to get your money out first
 - ▶ expectations that the fund may fail became self-fulfilling (exactly as in the model)

The policy reaction

- ▶ In our model, the bank continues paying c_1^* until all assets have been liquidated
 - ▶ policy reactions to a run in reality are more complex
- ▶ Nov. 29: the State froze all remaining funds in the pool
- ▶ Reopened a week later with pool divided into two funds
 - ▶ Fund A (86%): withdrawals allowed but with 2% penalty above a pre-set limit
 - ▶ Fund B (14%): no withdrawals allowed
 - ▶ money would be repaid as assets matured
- ▶ Action caused significant hardship for some participants
 - ▶ had to meet payroll expenses, provide social services (~being impatient in the model)

Epilogue

- ▶ Withdrawal restrictions on Fund A were eventually lifted
 - ▶ now operates as Florida Prime with 774 participants and \$10.5 billion in assets
- ▶ Fund B paid back 100% of principal by 2014
 - ▶ plus a small amount of interest; closed in 2015
 - ▶ participants losses: access to funds (and interest) for 2007-14
- ▶ LGIPs are a clear example “Diamond-Dybvig” banking
 - ▶ show the benefit of pooling funds and having the “bank” do maturity transformation
 - ▶ as well as how a loss of confidence leads to a run, with substantial costs for participants

References

“Local Government Investment Pools and the Financial Crisis: Lessons Learned” by Jeff Pantages, Government Finance Review, October 2009.

http://www.gfoa.org/sites/default/files/GFR_OCT_09_18.pdf

“Florida Freezes Its Fund as Governments Pull Out,” New York Times, November 30, 2007.

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